



The 9th Annual Conference of the Central and East
European Society for Phenomenology

The Many Worlds of Phenomenology
Umwelt – Mitwelt – Lebenswelt

Book of Abstracts

September 4–6, 2024 | Trnava (Slovakia)



Central and East European
Society for Phenomenology



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BOOK OF ABSTRACTS**

Central and East European Society for Phenomenology;
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**THE MANY WORLDS
OF PHENOMENOLOGY**

The concept of “world” as life-world and environment in which the human being exists belongs to the key concepts of phenomenology and is present throughout the entire oeuvre of Edmund Husserl. Its significance is also emphasised and culminates in the development of the life-world as a world of our life in his later texts, mainly in the *Krisis*. The concept of world also appears in phenomenology in connection with the criticism of scientific conceptions which consider objectivity, reality, and nature in the naturalistic sense. There were predecessors for the phenomenological concept of world: we encounter the notion of “*Umwelt*” already in works of Jakob von Uexküll, who opened new possibilities of investigation in the field of philosophy of biology, philosophical anthropology, phenomenology, and contemporary biosemiotics; Richard Avenarius, with his development of the concept of natural world, is another predecessor. After Husserl, the concept of world is subsequently developed in independent works by Martin Heidegger, Jan Patočka, Eugen Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe, Alfred Schütz and others. Many of Husserl’s followers were especially concerned with ontological questions, questions of regional ontologies, and questions of reality.

The topic of being-in-the-world and worldliness (*Weltlichkeit*) is especially important in the earlier period of Heidegger’s philosophy, while in the later period the relation between man and world is conceived as fourfold (*Geviert*). The concept of world is key in the thinking of Jan Patočka as well, referring to the overall horizon of sense which is exceptionally disclosed as withdrawing through problematicity, and also playing a special role in his understanding

of modernity, care of the soul, movements of existence, phenomenology of corporeality. Already beginning with the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology has been concerned with political worlds as well, this thread being continued, for instance, by Klaus Held. Phenomenological investigation leads us to further approaches of the world as both home world and alien world, and of the related phenomena of home, of the close and the distant, of the unknown, of the limit. At the same time, phenomenology is confronted with new challenges concerning the investigation of the nature and environment, which has led many researchers to focus on eco-phenomenology. Using the life-world as a leading clue of phenomenological investigation opens a new field of phenomena, of diversity of human experience and action, such as art worlds, scientific worlds, religious worlds, political worlds, cultural worlds, historical worlds, and others, all of which offer new possibilities of return to the one world in its plurality.

By envisioning several fields of research, this conference aims to discuss, for instance, how the world is connected with the investigation of space, perception and horizon; how it becomes significant for experience, subjectivity and corporeality. In our everyday existence we are present in the world, we dwell in it, we are incorporated in the world, we live there with other people; it is a space for our creative activities, for what we can do (*Ich kann*), for scientific investigations. Thus, goal of the conference is to explore the complexity of the concept of world in phenomenology, seen from multiple perspectives, not only in the various conceptions within the phenomenological tradition, but also in the current research.



KEYNOTE LECTURES

SONJA RINOFNER-KREIDL
Karl-Franzens-University Graz,
Austria



Exploring Values Bottom-Up Evaluative Experience and Perspectival Realism

The goal of this paper is to explain the complexity of evaluative experiences. As a result of this explanation, some related issues will be addressed that are crucial for current debates pro and con value realism. This goal is met by tapping the resources of a phenomenological investigation, dealing with different types of intentional experiences, their inherent structure, object-related achievements, and reason-giving force. Within a suitably rich phenomenological framework, experiences are analyzed in accordance with both a static-synchronic and a genetic-diachronic view. In the present paper, I argue that in any single occurrence of an evaluative experience, these two perspectives are inextricably interwoven and continuously interact with one another. Focusing on the intended object, these two perspectives manifest themselves as a double horizon of meaning constitution which is implicitly entailed in any presently enacted evaluative experience. The relating key questions are: How can evaluative experiences successfully address values bottom-up in a corrigible and intersubjectively shareable manner? How does this possibility match with the phenomenological insight that original valuation hinges upon acts that *immediately and feelingly* grasp value properties instantiated in a variety of different objects?

Typically, a phenomenology of valuation sparks off objections concerning the allegedly merely subjective character of the relating intentional experiences. These objections are part of an overarching debate in which various value subjectivist positions are opposed to various value objectivist positions. Value objectivism usually is conjoined with value realism. Although elaborating on a comprehensive conception of value realism goes beyond the scope of this paper, my line of reasoning has relevant implications for the debate at issue. First, there are negative implications. Which strategies of advocating a realist position are unpromising if one claims to consistently argue from a Husserlian point of view? Second, as far as positive statements are concerned, I suggest that the above investigation can be spelled out in terms of a phenomenologically based perspectival realism.



TAO DUFOUR

Department of Architecture,
University of Cambridge,
United Kingdom

Environmentality / *Umweltlichkeit*: World, Generation and Postcolonial Space

This lecture presents a phenomenological theory of spatial experience that it terms ‘environmentality’. The term is a rendering in English of the German expression, *Umweltlichkeit*, used by Edmund Husserl in his late works on themes concerning the role of generative relations in the formation of human community and world. Questions regarding the generative transfer of spatio-environmental sense implicate difficult interpretative problems, when colonial legacies of migration that involved mass and forcible displacements of populations are taken into consideration; such conditions determine the historical situation of the environmental horizons of the Caribbean. With reference to this Caribbean situation, we will consider the significance of the environing world for negotiating complex and often conflicting senses of the space of generative relationships, affections, and belonging characteristic of postcolonial contexts.



KAREL NOVOTNÝ

Institute of Philosophy,
Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague,
Czech Republic

The World as Flesh of Phenomena. Phenomenology and Cosmology, from Maurice Merleau-Ponty to Renaud Barbaras

The legacy of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, with its ultimate point of departure in the analysis and interpretation of the Life-World, since the Ideas II through the 1920s until the last works on the Crisis of the European sciences, is still a vivid part of the landscape of phenomenological research today, not only in the Husserl-Forschung itself, but also in the contemporary attempts to approach the world itself, as the true origin of phenomena. To speak about the world itself means, in a philosophical cosmology for example, a step beyond its horizontal givenness as analysed by Husserl, towards a world as a form of experience, a kind of a-subjective structure (Patočka), or towards a more dynamic framework of intertwining of the Life-World in a flesh of the world itself to use an expression of the late philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. These both moves, inspired by the first drafts of a cosmology in the phenomenological movement, elaborated by Eugen Fink, are the background of a renewal of this direction of the philosophical approach to the world, as developed by Renaud Barbaras today. The focus of the paper is the function of the world in a phenomenological elucidation of the appearing of phenomena.



LECTURES

AHMET AKTAS

Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA

World-Building and World-Losing

Heidegger gives a three-fold analysis of the lifeworld: the with-world (*Mitwelt*), the environing world (*Umwelt*), and the selfworld (*Selbstwelt*). These three aspects of lifeworld define the three domains of Being-in-the-world dynamically co-constituting each other in a process of world-building (*Weltbildung*): one's relationships with other people (*Fürsorge*), things occupying one's world (*Besorgen*), and oneself (*Selbstsorge*). Since the cultivation of one's existence in the world is dependent on one's involvements with other humans, things, and oneself, the disruption and loss of these constitutive relationships should be one of the central concerns of phenomenologists. In this paper, I develop the notion of "world-losing" departing from Heidegger's notion of "world-building" to give a phenomenological description of the disruption or loss of one's life possibilities. World-losing is the inseparable other side of the process of world-building and is co-constitutive with world-building in two respects. First, what constitutes Being-in-the-world is the possibility of losing that world. What constitutes certain life possibilities as my own is the possibility of losing them, i.e., the possibility of death. Even if the possibility of one's own death constitutes the basis of self-ownedness of my life possibilities, following Robert Stolorow, I will argue that losing significant others can also be as important as disclosing the essentiality of world-losing. The other aspect that shows the inseparability of world-building and world-losing is that every event of world-losing calls for new forms of world-building while forming new relationships usually requires losing others.

CÉSAR GÓMEZ ALGARRA

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Daseins' World. Cosmological and Phenomenological Reflections on the Ereignis-Writings

It is well known the strong impression caused in 1935 by the conference on “The Origin of the Work of Art”, when Heidegger exposed the polemical concepts of earth (*Erde*) and world (*Welt*). This intimate dyad, whose Hölderlinian roots did not escape the young Gadamer, represents one of the fundamental aspects of the *Ereignis-Denken* from the 1930s onwards, namely in its relationship with a non-metaphysical idea of nature. However, its elaboration within the framework of the conference, where the meaning of art does not cease to be preponderant, is far from exhausting a deep ontological dimension, which this renewed approach to the concept of world entails inside Heideggerian thought after the turn (*Kehre*). Through an extensive reading of his posthumous writings (ranging from the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* to different versions of the conference or some critical notes) we are now able to reach a better and more complete understanding with respect to the meaning of the world—after *Being and Time* and before the *Geviert*.

The aim of our presentation will be to clarify, on the basis of an analysis of these less known (and some recently published) writings, which phenomenological aspects can develop the new concept of world. Beyond a philological task, the interest of these writings lies particularly in how they advance a new way of linking the essence of the human being (as *Da-sein*) and the meaning of the world in its unfolding or swaying (*Wesen*), reinforcing thereby its (cosmo)genetical determination. Finally, we will try to assess the relevance of this new concept of world regarding some new tendencies of phenomenological cosmology—which, inspired by Fink, Patočka and Minkowski, experience an important renaissance nowadays.

ALEXANDRU BEJINARIU

“Alexandru Dragomir” Institute for Philosophy, Bucharest, Romania

Perceiving Together: Plural Subjectivity and the Common World

More often than we realise, one’s daily thoughts, emotions, or perceptions entail a ‘We’ rather than an ‘I,’ i.e., a plural rather than an individual subject. Hence, we can speak not only about a common cultural or social world but also about a common world of sense perception—one perceives not only with one’s own senses but also with the senses of the others through what Husserl calls in his *Gemeingeist II* “the constitution of the common sensible world (*Sinnenwelt*)” (Hua XIV, 196). This paper aims to clarify the Husserlian notion of a common sensible world by investigating Husserl’s analogy between the constitution of the surrounding world (*Umwelt*) of the individual subject and the constitution of the common surrounding world of a plurality of subjects. To do this, I begin by approaching a puzzling aspect: in the case of the individual subject, the sense-data that through apperception constitute the surrounding world are adequately given in the subjective sphere of immanence while the other’s sense-data can never be present as such in my own consciousness. Husserl’s solution, as I argue, resides in the specific *communicative* nature of the plural subject. By tracing Husserl’s concept of communication (first introduced in the *Logical Investigations*) and its role for the manifold layers of the empathic experience of otherness, I hope to shed new light on the constitution of the identical (home)world as the correlate of plural subjectivity. Finally, this allows to elaborate the question regarding the constitution of a common sensible world between plural subjects pertaining to different home- or alien-worlds. Can we still speak in this inter-worldly context of a communicative plurality? And if this is the case, then is the essential alienness of the alien-world as its fundamental inaccessibility still maintained or is it reduced to an all-encompassing sphere of rationality?

SIMONA BERTOLINI

University of Parma, Parma, Italy

Phenomenology in the Face of the Ecological Crisis: World, Environment, and Values

The notion of world and the description of human being as openness-to-the-world have a pivotal role in the phenomenological tradition. Albeit from different perspectives, phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger, Fink, Patočka etc. have focused on the structure of the world-totality and the way we experience it, by showing that the description of phenomena cannot fail to consider the whole horizon of pre-givenness in which they manifest themselves.

Yet, such a phenomenological focus poses new challenges nowadays, inasmuch as the actual environmental crisis evidently shows that our relation to the world and its balance got strained, thus requesting new reflections on the origin of this relation and its axiological implications. In particular, the question about the inherent value that we recognise to the natural world requires special attention, as the failure to consider this kind of value is one of the main conditions of the ecological crisis and our difficulty overcoming it. In this regard, phenomenology comes to intersect the environmental ethics debate and its attempt to justify the possibility of a non-anthropocentric and non-instrumental way of valuing the natural world.

Based on these premises, my paper aims at showing that the attention to the whole world's value already emerges from the phenomenological analyses of Eugen Fink and – first of all – Max Scheler, whose *Sympathiebuch* (in particular the second edition published in 1923) presents notions such as “cosmic unipathy” and “vital value”. The phenomenological tradition, while describing our axiological experience of the world, is thus confirmed to be a fruitful point of reference for both environmental ethics and any contemporary reflection on how to rethink our relation to the non-human environment.

JAN BIERHANZL

Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague,
Czech Republic

The Tragic of the World in Max Scheler and Judith Butler

In my paper I would like to deal with the tragic as a feature of the world, as the way the world shows itself, in the texts of Max Scheler and Judith Butler. The subject of the tragic, according to Scheler, is not the condition of the ego, nor is it an individual event in the world. "The remote subject of the tragic is always the world itself, the world taken as a whole which makes such a thing possible. This 'world' itself seems to be the object immersed in sorrow" (Max Scheler, "On the Tragic"). According to Scheler, the tragic always at the same time signifies the destruction of a value. In my paper I will focus firstly on Judith Butler's pandemic phenomenology (Judith Butler, *What World is this? A Pandemic Phenomenology*), which asks the question "what kind of world is it in which such destruction is possible?", and secondly, I will try to rethink the "hierarchy of values" that Scheler's conception of the tragic seems to presuppose.

TOMMASO BIGATTI

Independent researcher, Italy

Jacques Derrida and the (Non)-Transcendental Origin of the World

« dès qu'il y a, il y a différence »

J. Derrida, *La carte postale*

Within the wide landscape of post-Husserlian phenomenology, Derrida occupies an ambiguous position since he always underlined, on the one hand, the *belonging* of phenomenology to the so-called metaphysics of presence, and, on the other hand, he always stressed the phenomenological *transgressions* of metaphysics. Despite these ambiguities, I claim Derrida should be considered part of the transcendental current of philosophy, inaugurated by Kant and then carried on in different ways by Husserl and Heidegger. By

transcendental tradition I mean a tradition whose main philosophical question regards the *conditions of givenness of experience*.

In my presentation, I will argue that Derrida's *grammatological* project far from being a mere investigation of language, is rather a thorough phenomenological inquiry into the conditions of manifestation of the *world* and their limits. Firstly, I will present how Derrida approaches the question of transcendental, which is faced by testing its limits. Indeed, Derrida carries out a meta-reflection on the transcendental, investigating its genesis and asking for the *ultra-transcendental* conditions of possibility of transcendental itself. Secondly, I will show how Derrida deepens the Husserlian and Heideggerian inquiries on the *horizontal* of the world by the 'concept' of *trace* and by questioning the very movement of *formation of the form*, that is, the movement of constitution of the world. Paradoxically, the trace is 'something' that covers the entire field of entities but, at the same time, is the differential movement that, devoid of any positivity, forbids their full presence.

Finally, I will conclude that, for these reasons, the world, and experience in general, has to be *read* as a complex fabric of traces, that is, as a *text*. Such textuality of experience means that everything is *ab origine* marked by absence and empiricity and is tantamount to claim that what makes presence *possible* is precisely what makes it *impossible*.

EVA BLAYA MELCHOR

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Perishing and Environment. Towards a Heideggerian Ontology of Life

Although Heidegger's interests were focused on the question of the meaning of Being, our contribution shows the possibility of an ontology of life based on the concepts of "world" (*Welt*) and "finitude" (*Endlichkeit*) developed in his philosophy of the late 1920s. We begin by explaining the question of finitude and the reason why Heidegger differentiates between the dying (*sterben*) of *Dasein* and the perishing (*verenden*) of living beings (SZ, §§ 46-49). Although we cannot characterise living beings thanks to the

concept of *Being-towards-death*, we must admit that in the case of living beings, it is also true that no one can take their perishing away from them: no one can die *for* them. It is worthwhile to bring to light not only our everyday vague understanding of the finitude of living beings, but to reflect on the points in common between their finitude and our own. By doing so, we discover that *Dasein* encounters living beings in its world. This leads us to an explanation of the difference between “world” (*Welt*) and “environment” (*Umgebung*) (GA 29/30, §§ 42ff.), to the introduction of the concept of *environmentliness* (*Umgebunglichkeit*) and to the defence of an extension of the concept of “common world” (*Mitwelt*) to include living beings.

CRISTIAN BODEA

Romanian Academy, Cluj-Napoca Branch,
Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Imagination vs. the World: The Many Facets of World Phenomena in Marc Richir’s Phenomenology

The talk explores Marc Richir’s revised account of the world as phenomena, its relation to the phenomena of language and the importance of the innovative Richirian idea of the “phenomenon as nothing but phenomenon” (*phénomène comme rien que phénomène*). I will extend my approach to the field of psychoanalytic theory, on the basis of Richir’s equation of phenomena as nothing but phenomena and the Lacanian concept of the real.

My aim is to demonstrate that both the Richirian and the Lacanian theory are embedded in a vision of the world as essentially anarchic, namely, as lacking the unity of a unifying principle. I will argue that, because of this lack, sense-making is *unfulfilled* (i.e. unfinished, non-exhaustive) for Richir (hence, language as phenomena) and, at the same time, *impossible* for Lacan. Finally, I will show that the world as phenomena is always pluralistic in Richir’s view. In this sense, we can no longer speak of one origin of (our) *common* world, but about origins (plural) of the *shared* worlds (plural). However, because of its unifying workings, imagination distorts the world as phenomena and sustains the “transcendental illusion” of the “eidetic fog”, as Richir puts it.

Hence, this opposition between imagination and the world translates into a unifying principle prone to overcome the singularity of each and every phenomenon as lived by a unique subject.

ANDREJ BOŽIČ

Institute Nova Revija for the Humanities, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Vocal Worlds. Towards a Re-Thinking of Voice

Whilst voice, insofar as it, within the communicative situation, transformatively transfers senseful experience, seems to oftentimes—due predominantly to the focus on visibility—remain overheard as being merely the supplementary inter-mediator (the re-sounding “bearer”) of—the meaning(s) of—lingual inter-action, it nonetheless, and perhaps essentially, helps shape the human(e) co-habitation within the world. The overwhelming multitude of vocal expression(s), which co-defines inter-personal relationships, not only co-incidentally accompanies the effectuation of our daily lives, but likewise confers distinctly nuanced contours upon the fragile fabric of what interconnects us all, the text(ure) of the communal; maybe only as such “voice” becomes also one of the more (or less) widely (ab)used “similes,” possibly even a fundamental “metaphor” for the irreducible singularity of the individual. The presentation would like to phenomenologically approach at least some of the aspects of the comprehensive problematic field that a re-thinking of voice may encounter in the attempt to discuss the question how—and to what degree—does the vocality of (co-)existence, the capability of the human being to express itself through voice, co-constitute the experience of the world. To what degree—and how—does (a/the) voice convey the worldly dimension of dwelling? And: what does, what can it mean to listen to a voice, to hearken to its re-calling?

REMUS BREAZU

National University of Arts Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania

Primal Institution and Worlds

In my presentation, I will investigate how primal institutions (*Urstiftungen*), a foundational concept in Husserl's philosophy, fundamentally alter particular worlds, focusing on their impact on an individual's lived experience. On the one hand, Husserl employed the concept of primal institution to examine the genesis of meaning. Although he used the concept for the whole range of experience, primal institution was a concept mostly used in three main contexts: the genesis of types, the genesis of the personal style of an ego, and the emergence of philosophy in ancient Greece. The latter received the most scholarly attention. Besides *Urstiftung* and the more casual *Stiftung*, there is a whole constellation of terms that revolve around it: *Nachstiftung*, *Neustiftung*, *Endstiftung*, and even *Ur-Urstiftung*. On the other hand, Husserl's concept of world exhibits significant ambiguity. This ambiguity is both diachronic, reflecting the development of his overall conception over time, and synchronic, stemming from his specific research interests. More formally, he occasionally distinguished between world and worlds, the singular denoting an encompassing universal concept while the plural referring to particular horizons of individual egos or cultures. Although in his manuscripts Husserl raised the puzzling question of the primal institution of the world as such, he never reached a definite conclusion. However, my presentation will not delve into that topic. Instead, it will focus on primal institutions that fundamentally alter particular worlds. Consequently, the presentation will be structured as follows: after a brief presentation of the relation between primal institution (and its derivatives) and the different concepts of world as they appear in Husserl's works, I will narrow the investigation to the relation between primal institutions and worlds, i.e., those experiences that shape one's world, that is, both the personal ego and the objects it relates to.

JAMES CARTLIDGE

Central European University, Vienna, Austria

***Being-in-the-Virtual-World:*
Phenomenology, Immersive Experience, and Digital Art**

Drawing on Heideggerian phenomenology, this paper examines immersive experience in digital art, especially virtual reality (VR) and video games. It does so in critical response to David Chalmers' *Reality+*, perhaps the most famous recent contribution to the philosophy of virtual worlds.

For Chalmers, what is distinctive about VR is that its virtual worlds are immersive, while the virtual worlds of video games are not. Immersion is reserved for fully three-dimensional audio-visually represented VR, which makes you feel as though you are actually *in* a virtual world and have a perspective within it. Video games can be deeply engaging but, being merely two-dimensional representations on a screen, they do not achieve immersive experience.

I think immersive experience in these forms of digital art is more complicated, multifaceted phenomenon than Chalmers allows for. If being immersed in a virtual world consists in an experience which structurally resembles our being immersed in our actual world, immersion should be thought of as extending far beyond just our perceptual faculties. Furthermore—and by Chalmers' own admission—immersion comes in degrees.

By turning to Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world and reading the concept of immersion phenomenologically, I show how video games represent our being-in-the-world by inserting us into a context of significance and involvements, our engagement with which is only partially constituted by perception. Hand in hand with perception go the disclosive processes Heidegger called 'understanding' and 'mood', both of which play fundamental roles in how we apprehend, relate to, and manipulate the objects in our world in terms of what they mean for us and our projects. Because they insert us into a world in this sense, video games deserve to be called immersive, and their virtual worlds are often more immersive than VR experiences as the available technology currently stands.

GIOVANNA CARUSO

University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany

The World: A Pre-scientific Dimension of the Givenness that Enables a Pluralistic Approach to Reality

More recently, materialist approaches have accused phenomenology of being a subject-centred approach that makes the existence and validity of reality dependent on a recognising subject. Furthermore, this primacy of the subject leads to power relations that do not recognise the plurality of reality and do not allow access to the non-human. As an alternative, realists propose new ontologies (Harmans, Meillassoux), while posthumanists develop systems or networks that emerge through the equal action of de-subjectivised subjects and subjectivised animals, plants and objects. Thus, humans become hybrids (Latour) and cyborgs (Haraway), animals and plants become subjects (Braidotti), and objects and networks become agents (Latour, Bennett).

In my talk I would like to show that phenomenology, based on the concept of the world, overcomes dualistic and subject-centred ways of thinking and thus opens up a plural perspective on the non-human and on the interaction between humans and the non-human. After Heidegger's first phase of conceptualising the world as existential, phenomenology establishes the world as a given horizon of experience. The world is no longer conceived on the basis of human being, but human being on the basis of the world. This reversal of the relationship between human being and the world becomes very clear in the development of phenomenology: Heidegger's later 'worlding world', Fink's cosmological difference, Patočka's asubjective phenomenology and, not least, Tengely's metaphysics are different declinations of this primacy of the world over human beings. It is precisely this primacy of the world that makes it possible to analyse a complex reality consisting of the interweaving of artefacts, nature and human being. I will show the extent to which this is concretised by drawing on Heidegger's late philosophy and Fink's cosmological difference.

MARCO CAVAZZA

Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy

World – Space – Dwelling

Even more than 'being' or 'time', the concept of 'world' is the one that experiences the greatest conceptual shifts within Heidegger's thought. Far from addressing this complex scan (the main lines of which will be recalled anyway), I will focus on the difference between *Welt* and *Umwelt*.

Indeed, only by recognising their difference is it possible to follow the transformation of the world from *Being and Time* to the writings on the origin of the work of art in the first half of the 1930s. Moreover, that difference brings into focus a different understanding of space.

In *Being and Time*, where the world is approached from *Umwelt*, space is part of the world, which is the set of usage relations (*Verweisungszusammenhang*). This stance, conducted in an anti-Cartesian key, has repercussions on the notion of space, which, in fact, is absent in *Being and Time*, where there is rather the spatiality of *Dasein*. From this point of view, *Dasein* is spatial insofar as it moves within that network of references.

However, space cannot be reduced to this, and Heidegger realises this precisely from his reflection on the space opened up by the work of art. In analysing this passage, we will see not only what a space without a world consists of, but also a world without space. The latter case, inconceivable if by world we mean *Umwelt*, allows us to recognise the critical and profound instance of Heidegger's concept of dwelling. In fact, it is not simply a matter of being in the world, but rather of constructing a space within the world and at the same time transcending and articulating it.

I will therefore conclude by comparing this space-world-dwelling nexus with its analogue in French philosophy, where the world is *Umwelt* (habitat), dwelling becomes habit and space is that of the body.

CRISTIAN CIOCAN

University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania

Experiencing World as Adversity. Affectivity and Fatigue

The aim of my talks is to explore the experience of the world as adversity and resistance, by focusing on the phenomenon of fatigue in the writings of Emmanuel Levinas. I will tackle the question of affectivity within the dynamic between activity and passivity in experiencing the world.

I will show first why fatigue is not reduced by Levinas to a physiological or psychological phenomenon, but is reconducted to its ontological dimensions in relation to the world as such. I analyse the presuppositions of the fact that the fatigue is understood as a “position taken in regards to existence”, as “fatigue of being”. I further examine the phenomenon of fatigue in relation to other worldly affective situations, such as weariness and indolence, which are equally characterised by a refusal of being, by a non-acceptance of actual existence, by a powerlessness and passivity towards the world. I also focus on how Levinas redefines the Heideggerian notion of world, by uncovering the anonymous and impersonal dimension of *il y a*, revealed as indeterminate menace in the experience of insomnia, as an ontological horror, in relation to which the fundamental movement of the subject is that of evasion.

In the second part of my talk, I focus on the properly phenomenological attitude assumed by Levinas in his approach of fatigue, based on the observation that this subjective experience should be determined as a phenomenon “prior to reflection”. Considering this pre-reflective view, I will explore the embodied dimensions of the fatigue in connection with the analysis of the effort, and also with the phenomenon of labor.

EVELINE CIOFLEC

Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Sibiu, Romania

Uprooted Home. On Violence and Belonging

On the background of Husserl's difference between "home-world" and "alien world" (Heimwelt and Fremdwelt) I propose a phenomenological reflection on the concept of "belonging". Understanding "home" through "belonging" moves away from rootedness. As organic and flexible the latter metaphor might be, it still remains subject to inflexibility, being located in one place. Indeed, I work towards understanding home as being uprooted, however and all the more home.

Dwelling, as Heidegger has shown, is not a matter of not travelling, not migrating, staying at home. Rather, it is a matter of building oneself a home, of working on it, of inhabiting earth, as Burkhard Biella (1998) puts it in the opening of his book "Eine Spur ins Wohnen legen" (trans. "Setting a trace into dwelling"): "Martin Heidegger can count as *the* thinker of dwelling" (p. 9, my trans.) But then again, if we were to follow Heidegger, the topic is to be traced back to the beginnings of philosophy, as we read in *Letter on Humanism*: "The saying of Heraclitus (Fragment 119) goes: *ethos anthropos daimon*. This is usually translated, 'A man's character is his daimon'. This translation thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one. *Ethos* means abode, dwelling place. [...]. According to Heraclitus's phrase this is *daimon*, the god. The fragment says: Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of god." (Heidegger 2008, *Basic Writings*, 256)

With Waldenfels I will discuss the Plurality of Orders for experience and the occurring violence when order is understood as a totality. Also with Waldenfels I will discuss the term of belonging in the light of foreignness and the consequences for conceiving home. I intend to pinpoint how violence brings to the fore the fragility of home, by also rendering into question what "home" means: home as a shelter, a place we are supposed to feel secure, even a place we could feel "rooted", from where we can grow into the place we inhabit, from where we can reach out.

MATTHEW CLEMONS

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The Teleology of the World in Husserl's Later Thought

Whereas, prior to the 19th century, the notion of teleology was a mainstay in the intellectual currents of philosophy and the sciences, must seem all but indefensible to contemporary sensibilities. Even in Husserl's time, the concept, whether divinely, historically, biologically or otherwise conceived, had fallen out of fashion. At first glance, it appears to have no place in his thought. In *Ideas I* (§ 58), for example, among those things bracketed in the execution of the epoché and the transcendental reduction are all teleologies of the natural world as well as the question concerning the absolute ground for transcendental, world-constituting consciousness. It might come as a surprise, then, that we find Husserl in his later thought (cf., e.g., Hua XLII *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie*) espousing a metaphysics of a universal world-teleology and the concomitant idea of a divine all-consciousness.

In this essay, I explore two questions: 1) What is the meaning of such an idea for Husserl? 2) How does it emerge in his thought? Any answer to the first is foreshadowed by the answer to the second, and these ways are myriad: from the an analysis of the teleological striving inherent in world-constituting intentionality—first in non-rational instinctual consciousness and then in acts of reason; as a necessary postulate for practical reason, albeit in a sense different than Kant; as the idea inherent in the unfolding and axiological enrichment of the world; through the question of the ground of transcendental and intersubjective consciousness, etc. Thus, the major work of this paper is to sort through these ways, to compare and contrast them, and to consider how they might fit together.

ION COPOERU

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A Lifeworld of Recovery: Narrativity and Co-creation of Sense in a Center for Counselling in Addictions

Our understanding of recovery from addictions, from a scientific perspective, has broadened considerably in the last decades. Nevertheless, a neglect is observed in the way in which the lived experience of people in recovery is described, as well as in the way in which the role of recovery support services is conceptualised.

While the experience of addiction, seems to push us apart and confirm “the fundamental ‘unsharability’ of pain,” (Schaefer, 2026), some practices in the recovery from addiction, for example the peer support groups, show that another path is possible, namely that of sharing pain and suffering and liberating the potentialities of empathy.

In this paper I’ll present the results of a research, both phenomenological and interdisciplinary, conducted in the last years in a centre for counselling in addictions from Cluj. I’ll show how painful lived experiences can be expressed and how a lifeworld of recovery is co-created and maintained. I’ll explore how cognitive and affective factors are combined in a particular form of narrativity, which is crucial for people to make sense of their suffering and find ways of dealing with their addictions and co-morbidities.

The paper will bring forward the value of investigating the contours, the structures and the functioning of particular “painful lifeworlds” (Tabor and Constant, 2023), which can become places of transformative experiences as well. Additionally, I argue that the use of the concept of lifeworld in anthropology and practical areas, such as that of counselling and recovery from addictions, helps to further illuminate the meaning of this fundamental concept of phenomenology.

RACHEL COVENTRY

University of Galway, Galway, Ireland

Can Virtual Reality World? The Uncanny Valley as Absence of Strife

This paper questions whether a virtual reality can world in the Heideggerian sense. For the Heidegger of the *Being and Time*, Dasein is always engaged in a world and is not, in the first instance, a Cartesian subject encountering a pre-existing reality. Worlding belongs to Dasein but is prior to it and, as such, cannot be an activity of Dasein; rather, it allows us to engage with that which we comprehend. Worlding also belongs to other beings, particularly art. We are told that great art is truth, understood as strife between world and earth, between unconcealment and concealment. Thus, art is great when it worlds; that is, when it plays a role in generating or regenerating the world in which it has meaning. Greatness, in this sense is mediated between the work and its 'preservers'. The work allows change or displacement to happen in the world view of a historical people. This displacement is inherently unpredictable. Virtual reality aims to create a world in which human beings can interact with an artificial 3D environment, i.e., create a virtual world. For such a reality to world in the Heideggerian sense, it would have to share features with great art. A virtual reality, however, is a predictable, pre-existing reality that emerges from its programming and devices without strife. Theorists such as Anderson (2020) have argued that Mori's uncanny valley is "challenging revealing," thus, buttressing Heidegger's critique of technology. This paper develops such accounts in terms of art and strife. However, Heidegger also discussed the possibility of the confrontation with technology within art. This paper will ask whether such a confrontation within a VR is possible and how this might be manifested in terms of strife and preservation.

AENGUS DALY

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Darkness and Dream-Worlds: A Metaphysical Problem n the Early Heidegger

This paper explores the themes of darkness, sleep, and the dream world in Heidegger's work in the late 1920s. In the first part of the paper, I discuss how Heidegger appeals to our pre-understanding of the phenomena of darkness, sleep, and dreams, as well as of light and wakefulness at central points in his analyses. Here as elsewhere, his inquiry is characterised by a hermeneutic circularity: An existentiell pre-understanding of these phenomena informs the existential analysis of Dasein's being which in turn allow these phenomena themselves to be characterised more closely. In the second part, I discuss how Heidegger acknowledges that the phenomena of sleep and dreams pose a problem for his phenomenology of the world. He notes that sleep brings us before "self-manifesting beings" that "have their own peculiar world-character for the individual, in each case a completely different way in which they world" and even acknowledges that sleep opens up "a broad perspective which has been by no means grasped in its metaphysical intent." However, he refrains from developing this theme "for fundamental metaphysical reasons" (GA 26 220, MFL 172, GA 29/30, 92, FCM 61, 63). Finally, I broach the themes of darkness and dreams in their most direct and familiar sense with a view exploring their metaphysical possibilities. I first distinguish the experience of the uncanny in darkness from that of anxiety. Against this background, I then draw out the phenomenological implications of Heidegger's characterisation of the dream world by way of comparison with the kindred phenomena of daydreaming and the mythical world. In conclusion, I discuss why the dream world problematises Heidegger's understanding of world and of metaphysics in the late 1920s.

EVA DĚDEČKOVÁ

Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences,
Bratislava, Slovakia

The Cosmological Significance of Modern Nihilism

In my presentation, I will outline the understanding of the world in Eugen Fink's cosmological philosophy in relation to modern nihilism. What impact does a particular conception of the world have on the understanding of what is a human being, a community, a morality, or an ideal? Is a meaningful life at all possible after the collapse of traditional metaphysical interpretations of human existence? I will try to explain why, according to Fink, nihilism should not be seen only in a solely negative way, and what are the implications of this for the question of freedom, especially with regard to the rising phenomenon of technology.

ERIC EBNER

University Wuppertal / Karlsruhe Institute of Technology,
Germany

World as Meaning-Horizon in Husserl

In my contribution, I will argue for the thesis that an interpretation of Husserl's concept of the inner and outer horizon is best explicated in a context of meaning (Sinn) and not in a context of things. I will demonstrate that this interpretation has the advantage of allowing for better comparison of different horizons and illustrating how they are related without referring to an object. By shifting the focus from the things to the horizon, one can better analyse the relation between the "different worlds" such as the relation between the lifeworld and the scientific world. This procedure has the advantage of focusing on the respective "worldview".

In the first part, I will provide two indirect arguments for my thesis. Firstly, I will show that an object-oriented interpretation of the inner horizon leads to contradictions, especially in the pre-predicative sphere. Secondly, I will

demonstrate that Husserl is negatively influenced by his object-oriented thinking in describing the outer horizon. He emphasises temporal and local relations in thematising the outer horizon. In doing so, he can't explain relations of similarity and therefore types. For that, he must focus on meaning relations. I will conclude this part by summarising the thesis that the distinction between inner and outer horizon has to be banished in pre-predicative sphere.

In the second part, I will offer my interpretation that horizons can be described as meaning relations. I will demonstrate that an object is not necessary to show how the inner and outer horizon are differentiated and related. To do this, I will analyse Husserl's concepts of the material *a priori* and type and demonstrate how these implicit norms "rule" the references (*Verweise*). The relations between the two can be explicated by thematising the context and the possible references referring to each other.

MANCA ERZETIČ

Institute Nova Revija for the Humanities, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Diversity of Witnessing Contexts as a Differentiation of Personal and Interpersonal Experiences of Being-In-The-World

The article begins by providing a phenomenological basis for understanding witnessing as a (co-)existential mode of being-in-the-world. The conceptualisation of the phenomenon of witnessing encounters the circumstance that the various aspects of the phenomenon of witnessing cannot be defined in advance on the basis of a commonly valid structure, since they concern the multiplicity of our experience of the world. In this respect, a philosophical conception of witnessing based on hermeneutic phenomenology can offer a certain systematic approach to the phenomenon of witnessing in the fields of history, literature, art, law, religion, politics, archiving, biography, media and digital technologies, which must take into account both the specificity of the witnessing articulation and the horizon of the experience of the world that belongs to this articulation. This issue will be specifically explored in the

second part of the lecture, with a particular focus on the phenomenological conceptualisation of the different but interrelated contexts of witnessing.

JOSEF FULKA

Charles University / Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic

World and Hands: Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Gesture and its Practical Consequences

The aim of the paper will consist in confronting two disciplines that—despite indirect interactions here and there—have rarely responded to one another: phenomenology and gesture studies. In the first part of the paper, I will concentrate on Merleau-Ponty's famous chapter on language in *Phenomenology of Perception*. It is well known that Merleau-Ponty refers to the phenomenon of gesture in order to refute what he calls the intellectualist conception of language, that is, the view of language as an instrument that we use to convey the ideas “contained” in our mind. According to Merleau-Ponty, the meaning is rather directly *expressed* by language in the same way as it is visibly expressed by gesture (a gesture of anger, for example): this amounts to saying that rather than gesture having a language-like nature (which, of course, may often be the case), there is something profoundly gesture-like about language. I will argue, however, that Merleau-Ponty's view of gesture contains, at least implicitly, a remarkable reflection on the relationship that the embodied subject entertains with the world: human gestures, in their various forms, are in fact a way of relating to the world. This relationship is twofold: on the one hand, our gestures are shaped and determined by the structure of our *Umwelt*, but on the other, they are also employed to structure and to “appropriate” that *Umwelt* itself.

The second part of the paper will present several case studies of this dual relationship, drawing on the work of Adam Kendon and Jürgen Streeck, leading scholars in the realm of gesture studies. The aim will be to show that Merleau-Ponty's rather “abstract” philosophy of gesture may, in fact, represent a useful tool for the empirical study of human gestures themselves.

PAOLO FURIA

University of Turin, Turin, Italy

Unheimlichkeit and its Usages in the Framework of Phenomenological and Humanistic Geography

In my paper I will deal with the Heideggerian concept of *Unheimlichkeit* and its usages in the framework of phenomenological and humanistic geography.

My paper will be articulated in two parts. In the first part, I will introduce the concept of *Unheimlichkeit* by following Heidegger in *Being and Time* (1927). Here Heidegger reinterprets the psychoanalytic notion of uncanniness (Freud 1919) in onto-phenomenological terms, also retrieving its originally spatial character (*Unheimlichkeit* literally means “not-feeling-at-home”). According to Heidegger, spatiality is a fundamental characteristic of the *Dasein*. The constitution of a meaningful world happens when the *Dasein* is able to transform her surroundings into familiar places, where she can orient herself safely. *Unheimlichkeit* makes its appearance in relation to the analysis of *Angst*: when we feel *Angst*, everyday meanings of the world are suspended. According to Heidegger, such suspension of meanings is the most original phenomenon concerning the *Dasein* (paragraph 40). In this uncanny situation, however, the *Dasein* learns to understand the world as possibility: its meanings are never fixed once for all, its virtualities are never really saturated by any possible actualisation. At this point, uncanniness shows its potential: after the discovery of *Unheimlichkeit*, our gaze is refreshed and our existence is open to possibility.

In the second part of my paper, I will show how the Italian anthropologist Ernesto De Martino has interpreted “uncanniness” with reference to the spatial practices of settlement and migration of both nomadic and settled populations. In this framework, “not-feeling-at-home” constitutes one of the two poles of the “geographical experience” (Dardel 1953); the other pole is represented by being emplaced in the world, “feeling-at-home” in it. I will show how phenomenological geography retrieves the qualitative, affective, and experiential aspects of our “being-in-a-geographical-world”. Familiarity (or “sense of place”, Relph 1976) and uncanniness are used to evaluate the quality of the relationships between subjects and places. Given its nullifying power, uncanniness is often related to displacements and diasporas; however, it retains a

positive meaning when it is associated to the experience of the elsewhere, in the framework of a journey of discovery, thanks to its potential to challenge stereotypes about places (and their inhabitants), enhance our attention to space (which is, quite often, what we take for granted as the neutral backdrop of human action), and refresh our gaze towards it.

MINTAUTAS GUTAUSKAS

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Uexküll and Heidegger on the Human and Animal Environment

Uexküll has been the most influential biologist for philosophers. His attempt to develop a Kantian approach to animal life, his thesis that animal life is structured by the environment, and his reflections on the space and time of different animal species were very important for Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and many other phenomenologists. But Uexküll also left many questions unanswered. Depending on the focus of the philosopher, Uexküll's insights serve to support different theses. With Uexküll it is possible to show the similarities of human and animal life (Merleau-Ponty), but also the radical differences (Heidegger, Agamben). It was Heidegger who developed his thesis of anthropological difference on the basis of Uexküll's insights. The presentation will show the importance of Uexküll for phenomenology and Heidegger, which insights are important (notion of *Umwelt*, functional cycle, theory of meaning) and which questions were left open (possibility of interspecies communication, how is the human world constituted). The second part of the presentation is devoted to Heidegger. Phenomenological and metaphysical aspects of Heidegger's thinking will be presented. Heidegger was very attentive to the mystery of animal life and tried to define the limits of human experience through the critique of the theory of empathy. But on the other hand, he had made metaphysical decision about the essence of man and was involved in anthropological machine. It will be shown how he built his thesis of difference of essence, between human world and animal, on *weltarm* and *weltbildend*.

VERA HADZI-PULJA

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Social Virtual Reality, or how are Fantasy *Mitwelten* Possible?

It is certainly not uncommon for Husserl to use the notion of “world of fantasy” [*Welt der Phantasie*] or “fantasy-world” [*Phantasiewelt*] to describe, say, the mythological world of a centaur, or the fabulous world of Hansel and Gretel. However, speaking of a world in the context of fantasy—of a world in any strict sense of the term, that is—seems problematic from a Husserlian point of view. Indeed, one of the conditions for worldhood is, as Husserl claims on many occasions, its unified character. In addition, in order for something to be a world, it needs to possess some level of ontological richness: at a minimum, it needs to possess subjectively constituted spatiality; at an optimum, and on the side of nature—intersubjectively ascertained causality, on the side of spirit—intersubjectively ascertained culture, in the broadest sense of the term. The condition of unity thus needs to be fulfilled at any and all relevant levels of ontic strata: spatiality, causality, culture, etc. The problem with such a thing as a fantasy-world, is that it doesn’t fulfil this condition at a stratum underlying the minimally required stratum of spatiality, i.e., it does not meet the standard of temporal unity (Hua XXXIII, p. 336-337). “The” world of a centaur is thus rather a multitude of sub-worlds, one for each time a given subject conceives of it. Yet, social virtual reality, so virtual reality shared by more than one participant, seems to present an interesting counter-example to this conception: a fantasy-world fulfilling the condition of unity at the stratum of intersubjectively ascertained nature and culture. Assuming that the various forms of social virtual reality truly are fantasy-worlds, how could then such worlds possibly be constituted?

JAN HALÁK

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Cultural-Historical Lifeworld: Merleau-Ponty's Interpretation of Husserl's Notion of "Streaming In"

As widely acknowledged, Merleau-Ponty highlighted the reciprocal relationship between empirical (including scientific) and philosophical (or transcendental) explorations of the world. Remarkably, he also attributed this sense of circularity to Husserl. To deepen our understanding of this relationship, this presentation examines Merleau-Ponty's engagement with a set of ideas discussed by Husserl in the *Crisis* (§§ 59-60) and related manuscripts (Hua XXIX) in connection with the concept of "streaming in" (*einströmen*). Husserl recognised that scientific truths and theoretical practices not only refer back to the lifeworld as their foundation but also "flow back into" it, thus expanding it. While contemporary commentators occasionally discuss this concept, James Dodd (2004) emphasises it as a central yet still neglected notion in Husserl's transcendental philosophy. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty echoes Husserl's view that cultural constructions have meaning only for a subject who experiences "intuitively" a universal horizon of the *Lebenswelt*, and in contrast to it. However, Merleau-Ponty cites the concept of "streaming in" in *Phenomenology of Perception* to support his well-known argument about the "impossibility of a complete reduction." Later, he references it to challenge the strict division between "natural" and "constructed" aspects of the world. My aim in this presentation is to first explain how Merleau-Ponty conceives the mechanisms by which our constructions—especially linguistic, theoretical, and scientific—relate to the lifeworld; and second, to articulate in what sense the concept of *Lebenswelt* remains philosophically valuable, even if we accept that it paradoxically includes the representations we construct of it. I begin by providing an overview of Husserl's use of the notion of *einströmen* and its contemporary interpretations. Building on this foundation, I will explore how, in his late manuscripts, Merleau-Ponty adopts and transforms the idea of "streaming in" through concepts such as "brute world" and "brute Being," and how it leads him to redefine the relationship between the "natural" and "cultural" worlds.

ANIELA HELFRICH

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On Lost Worlds

In this paper I will on the one hand explore and challenge Heidegger's notion of the unity of the world (SZ, 69) by means of the experience of a great loss. And on the other hand, I will reveal how world's supposed unity shows the impact of a great loss, however. Hereby I will not contest Heidegger's constituents of world (and Dasein) which are the 'Existenzialien', i.e., ontological characters (of Dasein). But I will show that it is exactly because of the Existenzialien's equi-originary character that Heidegger's world can fail to be a unity for us. The notion 'Gleichursprünglichkeit' (equiprimordiality (Macquarrie & Robinson) or equi-originary (Blattner)) plays an import role in Heidegger's early writings, especially *Sein und Zeit*. By showing that a phenomenon's origin(arity) is interdependent and that it is constituted by this non-hierarchal relation, equi-originary objects, among others, the idea or rather assumption that phenomena ought to be grounded in one single ground (Urgrund). For instance, in a 1927 lecture on phenomenology, Heidegger shows that self and world always imply each other. In *Sein und Zeit*, however, Heidegger differentiates that. Here he shows that world is constituted by several Existenzialien, such as: understanding, 'Befindlichkeit', discourse, being-with and being-in. In this paper, I will explore that if a loss befalls us, it is in part because of the world's supposed unity constituted by the Existenzialien, among which: understanding, 'Befindlichkeit', discourse, being-with, being-in, that we can experience what has happened. While on the other hand, the experience that 'we fail to find the words', 'we don't get it', and 'a world has gone' shows (in part) that Heidegger's world can fall apart; or has never been a unity, after all?

SANDRO HERR

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Eugen Fink and Gilles Deleuze on a Phenomenology of Many Worlds

In my contribution, I want to examine the meontic thinking of the world in the early philosophy of Eugen Fink in relation to Gilles Deleuze's concept of multiplicity. Fink's idea of meontic is particularly interesting because, on the one hand, it deals with traditional themes of phenomenology and, on the other, it does it in such a way that phenomenology as a project becomes fundamentally questionable. According to Fink, world is something that resists the criteria of appearance and only appears as non-appearance. Here, the primacy of a foundation of sciences through a phenomenological epoché falls short and requires a change in perspective. We need an access to so called limit-phenomena (*Grenzphänomene*); the world, death, past and corporeality reflect the meontic relationship to the world and must be thought differently. At this point, Deleuze's reflections are particularly interesting. Deleuze, who has not yet been sufficiently examined in research in his relation with Fink, shares his meontic approach explicitly. However, even more radically than Fink, Deleuze develops a thinking of meontic multiplicity of worlds, all of which demand unique philosophical approaches. In the full sense of the conference "The Many Worlds of Phenomenology", Deleuze can offer a perspective according to which the multitude of world concepts in phenomenology has an inherent reason. It therefore opens up the path to ever new drafts of worldliness and how they border on others in the sense of a philosophical community.

MARCEL HOSU

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The Difference between World and Thing in Heidegger's Later Thought

The following paper outlines the development of the concepts of *world* (*Welt*) and thing (*Ding*) in Heidegger's thought starting with the late 1940s. It addresses the startling description of their difference and *in-between* as *pain* (*Schmerz*), a concept which does not seem to fit within a more classical ontological framework.

In *Unterwegs zur Sprache* we see Heidegger develop an opposition between *world* and *thing*, where the "worlding of the world" is separated from the *thing* which, in turn, opens up a world as *Geviert*. The difference between them creates an in-between (*Zwischen*) which is marked by pain: the pain of difference (*Schmerz des Unterschieds*). Pain can be hastily demoted to the level of affectivity or "poetic talk". Yet I argue that in Heidegger's usage, the notion of pain is neither subjective nor simply a manner of speaking. Rather, it describes the precise interrelation between *world* and *thing*. The paper also argues that the analysis of the "pain of difference" stems from the deepening focus on *negativity* in his later philosophy, which brings about a change not only in the language deemed appropriate for phenomenological analysis, but also in the scope of phenomena considered relevant in his unceasing ontological undertaking.

This broad concept of pain can shed light on Heidegger's enigmatic construction of the *Geviert*, which can be considered a theoretical stand-in for his later conception of the world. The "world" ceases to be understood as a horizon for transcendental subjectivity and becomes the pain-ridden *Gegnet* for the poetic dwelling of mortals. The paper ultimately argues for the necessity of the linguistic shift that takes place in Heidegger's oeuvre.

CHRIS IONITA

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Martin Heidegger and Meister Eckhart: Towards a Disclosing Withdrawal. For an Affective Reduction

My goal with this contribution is to highlight the pivotal role that the notion of attunement (*Stimmung*) plays in the context of Heidegger's later thought and its relevance in opening the horizon for being's presencing. I will begin by stressing an element of consistency that seems to persist throughout Heidegger's heterogeneous production: just as in *Being and Time*, the world as such is disclosed by our withdrawal from it amidst the *Grundstimmung* of *Angst*, so in the *Unpublished Essays*, Heidegger repeatedly addresses the enowing (*Ereignis*) of being itself in terms of a withdrawal (*Entzug*). I will proceed thereafter by arguing that this continuity between the existential analysis of the *Dasein* and the *Seyns-geschichte* could be better understood if we consider the affinities shared by Heidegger's thought and that of Meister Eckhart. Besides some striking thematic and terminological overlaps, most notably the notion of *Gelassenheit*, what is most relevant for my contribution is the circularity that brings together the "negative" aspect of what for both thinkers represents ontological experiences and the "negativity" of the very *Wesung* of being, or, in Eckhart's case, the nullity of the godhead. Such reciprocity, exemplified, for instance, by the chiasm between the *Abgeschiedenheit* of the Eckhartian virtuous man and the *Abschied* of Heidegger's *Seyn*, comes full circle with the Eckhartian teaching of the "Birth of God in the soul". Finally, I will read this "inception" (*Anfang*) in light of the "transcendental birth" conceptualised by Michel Henry, who, in this regard, explicitly references the Rhine master. Such juxtaposition will help me reevaluate Heidegger's various *Grundstimmungen* as instances of an ever-deepening radical phenomenological suspension that brackets what appears to let the appearing appear, thus opening a space for the clearing (*Lichtung*) of being. These *affective reductions* offer the ground (*Abgrund*) for what Heidegger calls the experiencing (*erfahren*) of the pure difference (*Unterschieds*), which in turn Henry addresses as the immanent self-affection of the ipseity.

DALIUS JONKUS

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Universality and particularity of the Life-world: The Concept of Universal Civilisation in the Philosophy of Husserl and Patočka

I would single out three major aspects in the concept of the life-world. First of all, the life-world is understood through opposition to the scientific world. Secondly, the life-world is understood as the everyday world of direct experience. Thirdly, the life-world is analysed as a priori of historical and cultural differences of life-worlds. The name of the life-world indicates that here the world is discovered from the perspective of life experience. If the world is examined without rejecting the practice of life for the sake of scientific objectivity, then, when turning towards valuable and pragmatic ways of experiencing the world, it appears that the world is not just the scope of natural extended bodies, but the scope of references and meanings. When describing how the life-world is given from the first-person perspective, it appears that the world is experienced as the significant surrounding world whose centre is me with my body. It is this aspect by which the living world is personally oriented towards the world of culture and history. The concept of the life-world is crucial to show how consciousness is embedded in a world of cultural activities and meanings. Is the living world as a cultural world universal or is it particular?

The purpose of the paper is to reveal the concept of the life-world by reflecting on the tension between universality and particularity. I argue that a phenomenological analysis of the life-world reveals the duality of the life-world. There are many living worlds, but they all share a universal a priori. Even more, the tension between universality and particularity in life-worlds manifests itself as a tendency toward universality. Husserl and Patočka examine this universalisation of the lived world through the idea of Europe. Patočka, like Husserl, formulates an ambiguous idea of Europe. On one hand, Europe is understood as a universal civilisation, which is based on knowledge of the world common to all, on the other hand, Europe is understood as a particular culture. This ambiguity arises because the idea of a universal civilisation as a philosophical culture, as a new type of community, emerges particularly in European culture. On the other hand, a community

open to all rational subjects and the historical dynamics of civilisational unification appear together with the process of Europeanisation. However, in order to understand how a common world is possible for all, why the universality of the life-world is the common basis of different ethnic cultures, it is necessary to separate the concepts of Europe as an ethnic geographical identity and as universal or supra-civilisation. Husserl and Patočka understand Europeanisation not as the spread of European ethnic traditions and customs, but as the adoption of elements of universal civilisation, as the discovery of common and repeatable insight.

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The Ungraspable as a Philosophical Problem

The Ungraspable as a Philosophical Problem provides an analysis of the ungraspable—of that which cannot be grasped by the mind or the senses. When referring to the ungraspable in sensible reality, we often speak of the “untouchable,” the “invisible,” the “inaudible,” and the “untastable.” In the abstract realm, we speak of the “non-conceptual,” the “ineffable,” the “unsayable.” These are the modalities of the ungraspable that are explored in this study. They have been considered absolute by some thinkers, a claim that I critically assess. My central claim is that the absoluteness of these modalities is linked to a desire to grasp, which is characterised by the desire for exactitude, for the proper, and for domination. First, I examine the role of the hand in phenomenology, more precisely in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, in order to further define the notion of the ungraspable. I then analyse Emmanuel Levinas’s early works, which offer an account of the ungraspability of nature (the *there is*). I then turn to Jacques Derrida, who has proved that otherness is not only human but also animal and theoretical, but who devotes little space to the otherness of the more-than-human, or inorganic objects. Finally, I examine the otherness of so-called *inorganic* or

more-than-human objects (natural objects and artefacts), demonstrating its importance to our current situation.

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Revolution as Instituting New World. Phenomenological Analysis of World of Revolutionary Experience

Phenomenological investigations are especially well-suited to capture the transformative effect a mass revolutionary experience has on revolutionary subjects. Merleau-Ponty has pioneered phenomenological reading of Marxist theory of revolution which precisely focused less on structural conditions of revolutions and more on lived-experience of the revolutionary subjects. This reading has not contended itself with analysing one aspect of revolutions, but sought to provide generative phenomenological account of revolution as such. In my presentation, I want to focus on the other pole of intentionality and address what happens with the world in revolutionary experience. Taking cue from Husserl's notion of "cutting-off of horizons" in case of aesthetic experience, I argue that revolutionary experience structurally similarly causes rupture in the world cuts off the horizon of world in which we lived until that time. From phenomenological point of view, what sociological analyses of revolutions do is that they analyse the initiating cutting off of horizons with a revolution's outbreak and subsequent reconnection of horizons with a revolution's pacification. What phenomenology is more interested in is the new world that revolution institutes. I will argue and explain how the notions of freedom and dignity are actualised in the world of revolutionary experience, and how this world is in a sense complete and holistically self-enclosed.

JULIAN LÜNSER

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On the Intersubjective Motivations of the Monad's Becoming

In a well-known quotation from the manuscripts on intersubjectivity, Husserl states that “monads have windows” (Hua XIV, 260). It is argued here that this quote can easily be misinterpreted: That is, the quote seems to suggest that ready-made, complete monads, with their established worlds, are able to start communicating with others through intropathy—if they chose so. In contrast, it is argued here that a genetic analysis reveals that monads have always already developed together, in an interconnected motivational community. This embedded becoming of the monad can be described in terms of the interrelations between my and the other’s “appearance of” the world, which are in continuous mutual correction and aspire toward the one and same objective world (c.f. Hua VI, 166-167; Hua I, 137). In this context, one’s own concrete appearance of the world has to be distinguished from the primordial world which results from the abstraction of everything alien (Hua I, 137).

On the basis of Husserl’s manuscripts on intersubjectivity (mainly Hua XIII-XV), this paper will attempt a systematic overview of the different ways in which different monads can affect each other (Hua XIV, 268f), and transform each other’s appearance of the world through their mutual contact. For this task it will be central to distinguish different motivational relations between monads. These distinctions will be guided by oppositions such as active versus passive genesis, bodily and pre-predicative communication versus linguistic communication and positive versus negative motivation, given that it is not necessary that monads tend to harmony when coming across a discrepancy. Hence, as an elaboration of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity, this paper will show in detail how the monadic community is already ingrained in every monad, including in their respective world.

NICOLÒ MAGGIONI
Collegio FINO, Italy

The Affective Manifestation of the World's Materiality: Insights from Michel Henry's Phenomenology

Phenomenology is arguably the philosophical tradition that has mostly underlined the affective character of our relationship with the world we dwell in. Differentiated in a kaleidoscope of phenomena, affectivity seems however to belong exclusively to the givenness of the world of values, covering like a film the material objects constituted in bare perception and always-already presenting us with a *personalistischen Welt*. Keeping in mind that for Husserl is an “abstraction” from value-predicates that faces us with the *Welt bloßer Sachen*, one may nevertheless ask if affectivity doesn't already play a role in the givenness of the bare material world.

In my presentation, I will support this idea following the phenomenology of affectivity developed by the French phenomenologist Michel Henry. In the first part, I will expound Henry's conception of affectivity *qua* self-manifestation of consciousness. Equated with such a “pre-reflective self-awareness” (to use Zahavi's formula), affectivity is conceived by Henry as the fundamental dimension of phenomenality grounding the intentional constitution of the world.

Consequently, Henry characterises the world as a proper *monde affectif*, including of course nature as the non-value-related layer of material things. In order to elucidate this seemingly-paradoxical thesis, in the second part of my talk I will turn toward Henry's theory of *action*, pivoted on the affective self-manifestation of the transcendental correlation between the “organic body” as “power-to-move” and the “reality of the world” as “absolute resistance”. In conclusion, I will argue that Henry succeeds in outlining a practical-affective givenness of the world's *materiality*, while however failing in providing an account of the intentional constitution of material things as *Einheiten des Sinnes*. His insights are nonetheless valuable for clarifying the rootedness of the material world onto the affective self-manifestation of our praxis.

JOZEF MAJERNÍK

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The *Lebenswelt* Is Not Enough: Husserl, Heidegger, Patočka, and Strauss

Husserl's doctrine of the *Lebenswelt* argues for the primacy of the natural human experience of the world of things that show itself to us. This world is the pre-scientific world and thereby the foundation on which scientific theories are built. This Husserlian account of modern science as founded on a more original mode of comportment (e.g. *Krisis* § 34) has been widely accepted among his students and successors. However, they have also widely agreed that Husserl failed to account for the ground of the *Lebenswelt's* natural meaningfulness to us.

In this paper I will look at three proposals for a reinterpretation of Husserl's *Lebenswelt* along these lines. The first is Heidegger's *Geviert*, in which the meaning of Being gives itself to us through a poetic vision of the whole. The second is Jan Patočka's characterisation of the natural world as *mythic* world in which meaning is simply accepted as given, and which is decisively transformed by the emergence of two forms of active questioning—philosophy and politics. The third is Leo Strauss's characterisation thereof as a world ruled by the *Law*, a term fundamental for both revealed religions and (in the form of the *physis-nomos* distinction) philosophy.

Patočka and Strauss agree that Heidegger was insufficiently attentive to the inherently political nature of human existence, as well as in their centring of the importance of philosophic questioning for a genuinely *human* life. Philosophy stands for both of them in a situation of political dependence on as well as opposition to the naïve, natural attitude. The relation of philosophy to the political community—or the relation of naïve meaning to the philosophic questioning thereof—thus is for both of them a central phenomenon of the “natural”, pre-scientific world.

ALBERTO MARAÑÓN

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A Self-singing Melody: the Umwelt-Theory of the Organism as a Whole

Jakob von Uexküll's take on the concept of *Umwelt* was never completely stable, it had to endure multiple transformations: in its early stages it was presented as an equivalent of the French voice *Milieu*, then a perception-shaped image of the world of action that every animal possesses and, at the zenith of its meaning a co-constituted unity of relationships that shape the very experience of life. Nevertheless, there was one aspect of the *Umweltlehre* that retained its first conceived conviction: the anti-reductionist battling idea that a natural being, that is, a subject, cannot be assumed as a *partes extra partes* ensembled machine that operates in an all static purely physicochemical external world. It's our aim to present the uexküllian vision of subjects that proposed that the way of existing of natural beings was to be conceived as a whole unity that shaped differently from a machine; in it, not only a methodological distinction was made, but an ontological one that propelled organisms as a complex relational form of being that distinguished the non-natural from the natural. Thus, both subject and world find a relational structure that binds them together in a co-constituted natural historical process that conceives the world as a meaning-making system arising from the interaction of different biological subjects as in an all-encompassing melody singing itself.

MARKO MARKIČ

Independent researcher

The Fullness of Authentic Experience as Maximal Anticipation: Conceptualising the Relation of Being and the Life-world

The life-world is always experienced as unique and universal (Husserl, Ideas I), yet this uniqueness and universality is not founded in the life-world itself: there is no life-worldly characteristic that could confer it or imply it. Their

origin is transcendental, namely the enigmatic uniqueness and universality of the meaning of Being (Heidegger). A problem thus arises: how can the enigmatic unity of Being be “present” in the life-world, and constantly determine its unity? The phenomenological interest concerns the question, how there pertains to the life-world a certain proper experiential unity, intimately connected to that of Being. My starting proposition is that the origin of this connection becomes apparent in authentic practical experiences (and negatively evidenced in anxiety, in which both the life-world and the meaning of Being seem empty), in which Dasein reaches the limit of interpretation of beings in terms of other beings, thus encounters the groundless uniqueness of Being and proceeds to reconstruct the life-world in a more authentic manner (Heidegger, *SZ*). I propose that the concept of fullness of experience can be useful in explaining how exactly this reconstruction happens. I first offer a phenomenological explication of characteristics of fullness, while understanding it as a dynamic (constant fulfilment) and problematic concept, due to the enigmatic relation to Being. I observe how the experience of fullness presupposes the lack of any proper, determined and self-fulfilled Being of beings, and that the meaning of Being, in its non-comparable uniqueness, does not get exhausted in any concrete given. I propose that in this way the experience of fullness presents a widening of the life-world horizon to its maximal limit by way of imaginative interpretative anticipation (Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 1929). I claim that such maximal anticipation reveals the proper uniqueness of the life-world, its relation to Being, which thus shows itself as having a practical meaning.

BENCE MAROSAN

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Earth as the Shared Home-world of Every Living Being. A Husserlian Approach of Eco-phenomenology

In my presentation I would like to speak about how Husserl’s conception of monadological intersubjectivity and axiology offer an up-to-date and plausible position for a contemporary eco-ethical and eco-political theory. In

Husserl's opinion every organism capable of conscious lived experiences should be conceived as a monadic ego, a concrete subject, ultimately, as a transcendental ego—even non-human subjects (e.g. in *Cartesian Meditations*, 1929/1960). It was also his opinion that world was constituted through the *entire*, universal community of egos, which community should be considered as *transcendental intersubjectivity*, and non-human subjects were also “members” of this community. A world that is constituted by a community of subject of a wider variety is richer than a world which is constituted by fewer subjects of fewer types.

This is the point where Husserl's axiology is also coming into play. Husserl kept lectures on ethics and axiology throughout his entire career as a philosopher (e.g. *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre. 1908-1914*, 1988, *Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924*, 2004, *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie*, 2014). According to him, life has an inherent *value*—both human and non-human. When we are confronted with values around us, they demand our respect, and they affect us as responsible agents. In Husserl's view if we want to live *authentically*, as rational and responsible subjects, we must respect life in all of its different forms—that means, *we shall not treat any living being in exclusively instrumental terms*.

Husserl thought that we have a *moral obligation* to realise as many axiological potentials as possible and help also other subjects to realise their axiological possibilities. According to this stance, as I will try to show, we must strive after protecting the ecological integrity of our planet.

MIHAI OMETITA

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From Indeterminacy to Astonishment: Merleau-Ponty on Film-Worlds

There is a wide agreement that Merleau-Ponty's longstanding interest in cinema is motivated by the assumption that the perception of what he regards as “film-worlds” can adequately illustrate the complexities of ordinary perception. I want to nuance this widespread view by revaluing his ap-

proach to indeterminacy as a positive and irreducible factor of everyday world experience.

Firstly, I will show that the notion of “indeterminacy” has at least three senses in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, which we could label as follows: 1) *entwinement*, e.g. of mind and body while engaged in emotion; 2) *viscosity*, e.g. of sizes, shapes, and colours announcing a phenomenon in the course of emergence; 3) *openness*, e.g. of one’s lived-world to surprise. On this basis, I will argue that, for Merleau-Ponty, film-worlds adequately illustrate indeterminacy as *entwinement* (cf. his “Film and the New Psychology”) and indeterminacy as *viscosity* (cf. his “Cezanne’s Doubt”), but not indeterminacy as *openness*. Indeed, given his narrow focus on a particular kind of classical fiction cinema, he takes film-worlds to be self-enclosed and self-subsistent and holds that “cinematographic drama [...] takes place in a world that is more exact than the real world”.

Secondly, I will suggest that, if we widen our focus to include other cinematic styles, we can, however, acknowledge the potential of films-worlds to illustrate indeterminacy in the last sense also, namely, as *openness* of one’s lived-world to surprise. As a brief case study, I will outline the effect of astonishment at the world, which Werner Herzog’s docu-fiction cinema often succeeds to induce. According to his interviews, he seeks to achieve that effect by “directing landscapes”, in order to function as environments instead of backgrounds, and to appear mostly alien and sometimes threatening.

WITOLD PŁOTKA

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How is the World of Artworks Constituted? Ingarden and Blaustein on Aesthetic Experiences

This paper addresses the problem of how one constitutes the world inherent to the artwork, for example, a literary work of art, a painting, a theatre play or a movie. Some art works function to provoke us to comprehend them in our aesthetic experiences as presenting the world, which is different from our ac-

tual life world and which is constituted in the relevant work of art. How shall one understand the structure of these experiences? What is the essence of the world constituted in these experiences? The planned paper will address these questions by exploring the interwar contributions of Roman Ingarden and Leopold Blaustein, who both had the opportunity to study under Husserl (although in different periods) and subsequently worked together on similar topics in the 1920s and 1930s in Lvov (now Lviv in Ukraine). Whereas Ingarden explored ontological issues of how the world of art works, ultimately defining it as a purely intentional object, Blaustein coined the term “imaginative world of art” to describe different types of aesthetic experiences. In the paper, I will juxtapose both theories by asking about overlapping topics (e.g., the question of the “*quasi*” characteristic of the world or the problem of schematic structure of the world of art works) and differences (e.g., ontological vs. psychological approaches in phenomenology). One of the key problems I plan to discuss is the relationship between objects of the represented world as the world as a whole, which is composed of these objects. It is also planned to juxtapose both theories in the context of exemplary cases of art works, e.g., how the world of a novel is constituted.

MATĚJ PUDIL

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Deafblindness in the Interpretation of Phenomenologists – Phenomenology in the Interpretation of Deafblindness

The topic of deafblindness appears episodically in phenomenological analyses of perception and human relationship to the world. For example, E. Cassirer deduces from the well-described famous example of the deafblind H. Keller, who not only mastered sign language for essential communication with her surroundings but even became the author of several literary works, that “even the world of a deaf, dumb and a blind child can become incomparably wider and richer than the world of the most advanced anim-

als.” M. Merleau-Ponty, in *Phenomenology of Perception*, also mentions H. Keller in passing in a passage focused on synaesthesia.

The contribution aims first to present the context in which the situation of deaf-blind people becomes an example within the framework of a phenomenological description of the human relationship to the world (a theme that appears in the works of authors following the thinkers mentioned above). On the other hand, however, in some cases, phenomenology becomes a tool through which experts in the field of so-called *congenital deaf-blind studies* shed light on how a deaf-blind person experiences the world and how she discovers the world through, among other things, communication with sighted and hearing people around her (as an example we can mention D. Goode's book *A World Without Words*). The second goal of the contribution is to show what the phenomenological analysis shows as beneficial for this area. The conclusion is that the debate between the two sides can be mutually beneficial.

MARIE SASSINE

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Jan Patočka Critique of Husserl's Life World and Phenomenology of Corporeity

It can be said that of Patočka that he is Husserl's direct heir, and much of his work is in close dialogue and reflection on Husserl's legacy. One significant area of divergence, however, between Patočka and Husserl is their view of the natural world, or the *Lebenswelt*. For Patočka, transcendental subjectivity encountering a pristine natural world, a life-world of pure evidence unencumbered by history, is a philosophical dream. Phenomenology was to be rooted in the primary evidence of the life-world, one founded in a return to the things in themselves. But it is precisely this supposed accessibility of an originary world that troubled Patočka. He came to believe that it was impossible to arrive at a purely 'unconstructed world'. Husserl's *epochē* and how it brings forth phenomenon as phenomenon remains a crucial step for him, and his approach seeks to deepen Husserl's insight to show the transformative power of the freedom revealed by the *epochē*.

For Patočka, the *epochē* reveals a basic material constancy, but also and mainly lights up the problematicity of manifestation, of a world appearing to a creature who sees it as a totality. The notion of ‘world’, however, seemed to him a fundamental concept in defining a truthful and historical life in a community. But even though he criticizes the possibility of a pristine natural world, he does not reject the notion of ‘world’ but, rather, enlarges it beyond the scope of reflection or perception. He insists on the primacy of our corporeal existence. Having a body compels us first and foremost to act in our world. And as we act, we change our world. We live in a world altered by human action and we, in turn, continue to add our own constructs and creations. As *actors*, the important question for us is how to orient our action.

MILOŠ ŠEVČÍK

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Void and Temptation of Elements: Reflections of Jan Patočka and Emmanuel Levinas on the Aesthetic Experience of Nature

The paper will deal with Jan Patočka’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s remarks on the character and significance of the aesthetic experience of nature.

First, the paper will focus on Patočka’s reflections from his manuscript “Eternity and Historicity”. He speaks of the “alluring spectacle of nature”, of the “immensity” of nature’s “elements”. Everything in nature is a manifestation of “beauty, majesty, grandeur and sublimity”. But in this “rejuvenating, reviving experience” of nature, there is a kind of “emptiness and expectation”. Patočka points out that this attraction to the empty depths of nature is felt very strongly in some situations, especially when observing the eternal cycles of nature, the great theatres of the rhythmic movement of the universe.

Next, the paper will discuss the remarks on the enjoyment of nature that Levinas offers in his book “Totality and Infinity”. In nature, interiority is bathed in quality, but quality manifests itself as a determining nothing. The element is utterly anonymous; it is “wind, earth, sky, air, sea”. On the one hand, Levinas conceives the indeterminacy of the element, however, is not

equal to infinity transcending boundaries. However, on the other hand, the enjoyment of the element is without security; it refers to the instability of happiness. Enjoyable qualities come by “a happy chance”.

It is remarkable that the way of characterising the double action of nature is almost identical in Patočka and Levinas. Both emphasise the negativity in the experience of nature, the indifference and “nocturnal” anonymity that speaks from nature despite the pleasures that nature provides. Both authors also conceive of the experienced anonymity and indifference of nature as prompting a movement of transcendence. In particular, the paper will point out that both authors promote the holistic character of the experience of nature. From this perspective, the paper will deal with the relation of Patočka’s and Levinas’s views to the contemporary theory of aesthetic atmospheres put forward by Gernot Böhme.

TOMAS ŠINKŪNAS

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Disgust and Trash: An Eco-Phenomenological Exploration

The term Anthropocene, originating in geological discourse, signifies a profound shift in perspective: human activities have wrought irreversible changes upon the Earth (Crutzen, Stoermer 2000). Eco-phenomenology posits that a thorough evaluation of this paradigm necessitates a phenomenological inquiry (Brown, Toadvine 2003). Within this framework, the ramifications of waste, trash, and garbage are recognised, but they remain largely unexplored. More often than not, particularly within discard studies, the longevity and persistence of objects of trash have been positioned as a non-experience, as something, that emerges as waste, remnant, artefact, or discard, as sediments of human activity. This poses a significant challenge for phenomenology and eco-phenomenology.

There is an inherent disgust associated with trash, even if such an experience reflects but a fraction of what trash actually is. Though disgust fades once the object exits perception, its role in shaping our conception of trash cannot be overstated. Phenomenologically, the disgusting experience of

trash has many dimensions: aesthetical, physical, moral, psychological, political, existential, etc. The axiological aspect of this experience highlights how disgust enforces a negative valuation of trash. Disgust sediments within discarded objects, and once these sediments are reactivated in the environmental context, they play a role in our conception of the world as they carry over into ecological consciousness. Consequently, this paper aims to elucidate the intricate relationship between trash and disgust within an eco-phenomenological framework, while remaining mindful of the inherent limitations of the phenomenological approach.

WOJCIECH STARZYŃSKI

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The Affective-Volitional Experience of the World through 'Metaphysical Qualities' in Roman Ingarden's Phenomenology

Although Roman Ingarden's phenomenology is most often associated with his ontology of the formal type, this does not mean that the Polish phenomenologist did not develop his own conception of the lived world in an anthropological context. One can point to a three-stage reflection on the world: (a) in the spirit of realism, according to which the real world appears to the subject as a structured network of interrelated individual objects, and which as such does not depend on the activity of human consciousness; then (b), still bearing in mind this foundation of the real world, one can speak of a specifically human world of intentional objects, which in its existence depends on the creative and reproductive acts of consciousness. Finally, (c) Ingarden speaks of a transcending human world of 'higher powers', which is revealed subjectively through the experience of so-called 'metaphysical qualities'. In my presentation, I would like to focus on understanding the world in this third sense. It seems that the phenomenalisation of the world understood in this way goes beyond the limits of rational argumentation and takes place at the level of specific experiences of the mystical-extatic type, which constitute an important factor and even a peculiar axis of human action in

the world. This particular volitional-affective phenomenon, about which Ingarden writes, among other things, in the essay “Man and Time”, seems to constitute the subjective bond of the experience of the world in general. Ingarden describes this experience in two stages: in a preliminary form, it can be spoken of at the level of the experience of art (especially in literature, as he writes about in his “Literary Work”), and in the proper sense it takes place through the first-person realisation of the values of “truth, goodness and beauty” in the real world.

JON STEWART

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Phenomenology of Religion in Ancient Mesopotamia

With the present study I wish to investigate the religious experience of the ancient Sumerians and Akkadians, whose rich and complex conceptions of their gods and goddesses has proven to be a source of considerable debate. One reason for the debate is the great antiquity of these cultures and the scattered and fragmented sources we have concerning their religious views. Indeed, there are many interpretative difficulties that stand in the way of understanding the religion of these peoples. The myths of the ancient Mesopotamians were complex and changing. There are different versions that make it difficult to talk in any definitive way about this material. Moreover, the iconographical record is inconsistent and usually difficult to interpret. The gods seem to be portrayed in different ways, and often it is unclear which god is in fact depicted. Moreover, the sheer number of their deities and supernatural entities is enormous, and bringing order to all of them with complete consistency seems impossible. It is thought that the Sumerians and the Akkadians had more than 3600 gods and goddesses! The first historical records that come down to us are from around 2900 BC, but the religious beliefs of these peoples come from a much earlier, prehistoric time. In this paper I propose to demonstrate that a semblance of order can be found in the development of their conceptions of the divine from zoomorphic to anthropo-

morphic. This development took millennia, but when seen over this vast period of time, a logos can be discerned.

TANJA TODOROVIĆ

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Rethinking Mediation in Husserl's Philosophy through the Notions of *Bildwelt*, *Lebenswelt*, and *Kultur*

Edmund Husserl devoted considerable attention to the study of the concept of imagination [*Phantasie*] from his early writings to his late period of research. He has shown that imaginative consciousness builds a specific type of world that has its own temporal dimension. Imaginative consciousness is defined as “presentificational” [*vergegenwärtigendes*] consciousness, which places phenomena in a certain time horizon. His assistant, Fink [*Eugen Fink*], will be one of the first authors to show that the phenomenological concept of imagination and memory does not simply present some “theory of images”. Namely, he argued that Husserl’s goal was to explore the role of the image in *new horizons and worlds* and to show the specific time and manner in which pictorial presentations build an *image-world* [*Bildwelt*].

An insight that will determine further exposure is the distinction between two types of fantasy phenomena constructions: the first represents the mode in which Husserl examines the role of *pure fantasy* in the transcendental-phenomenological approach, and in the second one he argues about the manifold ways in which the subject mediates his *image-world* and creates not only the *aesthetic objects*, but also the whole new *culture-world* that arises from the surrounding world [*Umwelt*]. The world of culture represents a special domain of material ontology, and it is not possible to define it without the conceptualisation of the notion of the *life-world* [*Lebenswelt*]. In order to present the specific way in which Husserl sees the possibility of the self-renewal of humankind through the cultural domain, comparing Schiller’s [*Friedrich von Schiller*], Husserl’s, and Fink’s concepts of culture one can emphasise why this domain is crucial for the possibility of transforming humanity.

RICCARDO VALENTI

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**The Many Worlds of τέχνη.
On Science's Putative Forgetfulness of Lebenswelt from
Arendt to Serres. An Ecological Response to Husserl's Crisis**

Telescopes allow us to see what is distant, such as the moon's irregular surface. However, due to their instrumentality, the image rendering leaves those basins in the remoteness of scientific representation, for the seizing of lunar craters is unmanageable to the unaided eye. According to Husserl, the Galilean program of the mathematisation of nature precisely diverted the genuine dimension of everyday sensible experience. Despite the indisputable plainness of the modelling he proposed, the Astronomer would have overstated the clairvoyant power of his discipline. It is the main critique Husserl addresses to the Modern scientific understanding of the lifeworld (or *Lebenswelt*). Indeed, from Modernity on, as we can read in *Crisis*, scientific representations would have moved away from the immediate concreteness of lifeworld—which phenomenology, on the contrary, aims to recover—in the elaboration of increasingly complex but void and abstract replicas of mathematical substitution of real-world entities. It is something not only Husserl remarked.

Indeed, Arendt particularly stressed the technical and sometimes harmful use we make of these more and more perfect theoretical achievements. According to Arendt, the distance of mathematical modelling makes us alien to ourselves and to the world that we occupy. The Earth, devoid of its centre, thus becomes dominatable by the technique we use to *lift* and control it via the Archimedean point. It is against this understanding that Serres' *Natural Contract* also stands. Here, the Frenchman precisely criticises our parasitic behaviour toward the world we inhabit. To overcome our natural parasitism, we must transform ourselves into symbionts and recover a more genuine sense of the real, beyond the blind vision of technique and scientific representation.

My talk will focus on these two perspectives. Here, I will try to show the elements of continuity with Husserl's phenomenological reflection for the development of a more conscious use of our means.

SERGEJ VALIJEV

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Personal Individuality and the World. Heidegger and Beyond

In my paper, I am going, first, to turn attention to the individuality of *Da-sein* in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, as expressed by the notion of *Jemeinigkeit* (cf. § 9 of *Being and Time*). Afterwards, the worldliness of the world and the spatiality of *Da-sein* will be highlighted (cf. §§ 14-18 and §§ 22-24). Thus, the essential insight of Heidegger regarding the *Da-sein* as a "place" where the question about the meaning of being takes place will be taken up in connection with the character of *Da-sein* as being-in-the-world. As care (*Sorge*), including and determining also taking care of things (*Besorgen*), is stated by Heidegger to be *Da-sein's* being (§ 41), it follows that the world is disclosed by the being of *Da-sein* (§ 43a). Therefore, *Da-sein* manifests itself as a primary instance of sense which, although always placed within the world, transcends it in a way that the world is given a sense as part of *Dasein's* quest for meaning of his own being. But how does it come that *Da-sein* is disclosed to itself at all? What is the character of his being-given, of his givenness? Hence a question arises, firstly, whether Heideggerian existential analytics reflects the human individuality and its relation to the world fundamentally enough; and, secondly, whether the concept of *Da-sein* should be overcome and some concept of a subject reintroduced in order to provide for a possible explanation of the world as a horizon of sense radically intertwined with human subject. Overcoming does not mean rejecting completely—thus, human subjectivity still has to be conceived in a manner that would prevent falling in the metaphysics of presence.

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Transcendental Methodology and the Experience of the World. Two Generations on Husserl's Idealism

After the publication of Husserl's *Ideas I*, Edith Stein describes in a letter to Roman Ingarden her relationship to Husserl's transcendental idealism as the one that "must be understood differently" and "in Husserl's sense". Eugen Fink also reports in his essay "Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik" (1933), about the misinterpretation of the transcendental phenomenology Husserl based on the *Ideas*. In my paper, I attempt to confront the different interpretations of Husserl's transcendental idealism, at the two generations of Husserl's students, by the interpretation and extensive thematisation of the Husserlian methodology. Although in different ways, the question of the methodology of Husserl's phenomenology was formulated by the two generations of the early Munich-Göttinger students and by Eugen Fink through the problematisation of the experience of the world, the constitution, and the role of memory. The difference is remarkable in the different approach to the methodology: Whereas the world experience, the external world, the constitution and reduction appeared for the early phenomenologists as fields of the intentionality, the phenomenological method is in itself and inseparably realised in the world experience and constitutional process for Eugen Fink. The question for Fink is, of what happens during the constitutional process, and how the world experience and the external world are inseparably connected with the constitutional act of the consciousness. Based on my hypothesis, the difference of the interpretations is founded on Husserl's step-by-step methodological phenomenology. The present contribution will look behind the meanings and methodological consequences of the world experience in the different generations of Husserl's circle, and outline Husserl's methodological development between the publication of the *Ideas* and the appearance of the *Formal and transcendental Logic* and the *Cartesian Meditations*.

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The Life-World and Vaccine Hesitancy: Mutual Enlightenment between Phenomenology and Empirical Research

While the concept of the life-world—among many other concepts, such as embodiment, space, time, selfhood, affectivity and intersubjectivity—has been employed in applied phenomenology to analyse such health and health care related experiences as illness and disability, use of technologies in health-care, and the patient-health care professional relationship, its has scarcely been used to analyse public health issues. In this context we want to explore the analytical potential of the concept of the life-world in the field of public health. More concretely, based on phenomenologically informed qualitative research (specifically, the methodological approach ‘Phenomenological interview’), our aim is to show how Edmund Husserl’s concept of the life-world can help us better understand vaccine hesitancy in the context of COVID-19 pandemic and, at the same time, how the interview material can generate material for more nuanced understanding of the concept of the life-world. We have identified two core determinations of the concept of the life-world which lie behind vaccine hesitancy. One of them is that the life-world is an embodied, perceptual world; and the other is that the life-world is the transparent, taken-for-granted background of our daily life. Discussing the ways these determinations of the life-world and their interplay lead to vaccine hesitancy, we will also argue for the potential of the empirical (interview) material to inform phenomenological thought in the form of the more nuanced understanding of the concept of the life-world. With reference to the interview material and Havi Carel’s concept of ‘global uncertainty’, we will argue that the life-world can be understood as a dynamically shrinking and expanding process, which we further clarify via the concept of ‘dys-appearance of the life-world’.

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Mistrust in the World

The phenomenological experience of the world – whereby the world is correlative to one’s consciousness or understanding (*Verstehen*)—is inextricable from an affective background (*Befindlichkeit*). Taking this insight into account, I will analyse a fundamental modification of the affective experience of the world in the case of people suffering from schizophrenia. I will argue that the fundamental belief in the existence of the world (*Urdoxa*) is accompanied by a primal mood, an “existential feeling” (M. Ratcliffe), specific to the natural attitude, which can be described as *trust* (N. de Warren). In other words, the world is posited as *being* when it is being *trusted* in the first place. Conversely, in schizophrenic modification of self- and world-experience, the basic mood accompanying one’s alienation from the common-sense (W. Blankenburg) will be interpreted as a fundamental *mistrust*. The failure of trust, which defines the psychotic wariness, bears an intersubjective or social character. Such an analysis, which takes the (mis)trust as the core of subject’s relation to the world, can have not only a theoretical import, but also a practical one, specifically within the field of medical humanities. Theoretically, in taking moral emotions (A. Steinbock), such as trust, to be fundamental for schizophrenic experience, one would have to acknowledge the essentially intersubjective grounding of mental affliction. In this regard, it is not possible to give a phenomenological account of the psychotic experience within the immanent sphere of consciousness. As a result, from the practical point of view, one would have to embrace the idea that the social world is able to shape subject’s mental state in a critical way. In the final analysis, I will argue that creating a space of trust for those bearing a radical mistrust in the world should be an essential prerequisite in their therapeutic process.

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The Place of Human in the World – with Patočka and Plessner

The aim of the contribution is to trace the convergence of the philosophical works of Jan Patočka and Helmuth Plessner. Both belong to the generation of Husserl's students, and although there are no explicit textual overlaps between their two philosophical projects, certain point of meetings can be found on the topic of home, space and the world. I will draw on Plessner's eccentric positionality that leads to the uncovering of significant phenomena which express complicated situation of a person oscillating between taking root and aiming for home on the one hand, and the impossibility of finding one's definitive place on the other (as it is articulated in the principle of utopian standpoint). This anthropological project can be seen in phenomenological intersection with conception of Jan Patočka and his text on home, space and world from 60th as well as on sculptural artworks from 1969. In the first consideration Patočka points out that being in space is not just about understanding relations as they are already laid out and arranged, but precisely about the "how" they are arranging and establishing ("getting/moving into order", "pořádání"). Constitution of home is thus seen in relation to the order of the universe. In the second consideration he points out that the sculpture as a haptic echo of the world gives an experience of the world in its basis. In the contribution we will demonstrate, how for both thinkers, home emerges as a place that is constituted by being addressed by the other, non-place and by developing the verticality of experience, as in religion or art. Against the background of this examination can be developed genetic and generative insights into the place of human in the world.

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Threefold Homelessness: the Classic, the Romantic, and the Modernistic

'Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world', writes Heidegger (2008: 243) in *Letter on Humanism*. This existential-ontological homelessness underlines the tradition of phenomenology, which, overall, can be read as an existential philosophy to dwell, to become at home in the world. To evaluate phenomenology in this light, I argue, we must first comprehend the issue of homelessness in its magnitude and density. This is what I propose to do in this paper, consisting of three parts. In the first part, 'Classic homelessness: the eternal resurrection of tragic consciousness', I argue that the tragic experience, especially the encounters of death, guilt, and suffering, constitutes the most fundamental dimension of homelessness. Any attempt at homecoming, therefore, must acknowledge this inalienable alienation of being human. Key inspirations here will be Karl Jaspers' notion of the limit-situation, his *Tragedy is not enough*, and tragedies in world literature. In the second part, 'romantic homelessness: the poetry of heart and the prose of circumstance', I argue that homelessness takes on a new dimension with post-Cartesian ontology, the subject/object divide. Crucial to this section is the sensibilities of inwardness, alienation and the disenchantment of the world. In the third part, 'modernistic homelessness: schizophrenia or utopia, that is the question', I argue that, in the 20th century, the homelessness that phenomenologists encounter, becomes totalistic. It manifests psychologically as the symptoms of schizophrenia, the fragmentation of the self, and politically as totalitarian regimes, the reactive endeavours of total control. For this part, Hannah Arendt's studies of totalitarianism and Louis Sass's phenomenological descriptions of schizophrenia will serve as the guideline. Overall, this paper contributes to 'The Many Worlds of Phenomenology' by describing the three worlds of homelessness that overlap in the predicament of our contemporary life world.

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Cosmos as the Self-manifestation of God: Michel Henry reads Jakob Böhme through Alexandre Koyré's Lenses

I explore the influence of Koyré's 1929 book on Jakob Böhme on the 'acosmic' phenomenology of Michel Henry. Koyré describes Böhme's mystical theosophy in the terms of self-manifestation of the Absolute. The Absolute desires to manifest itself and, to do so, creates the world. As Michel Henry puts it, an apparently theological problem (why God created the world) is dealt with in a purely phenomenological way: the Absolute manifests itself in the world and through the world, so that the world can be seen as God's 'medium of phenomenalisation'. Henry extends his disapproval of Böhme's cosmogony to all theories of manifestation which stem from the German idealism, including Husserlian theory of intentionality. For Henry, the cosmological dimension of human experience has nothing to do with the primary mode of subjective life, that is, with pure self-affection. I show that Henry overlooks the question of nature, discussed by Koyré in his book on Böhme, and therefore he underestimates the role of the cosmological dimension in the subject's access to God and to herself.

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Meaning of "Meaning," and the Teleological Structure of the World

What is the meaning of "meaning" when we are talking about "the meaning of life"? In contemporary analytic philosophy of meaning in life, there is a second-order debate over the sense of "meaning." In sharp contrast to the traditional view that life's meaning is mainly something related to value, a recent turn—"the narrative turn"—suggests that meaning relates to making sense of something in terms of a larger *context* or framework. This raises

some opposition from supporters of the traditional, “value view.” Both views are reasonable to some degree; so we are left with a dilemma.

I suggest that this dilemma can be resolved by resorting to Heidegger's analysis of the structure of the everyday world in terms of involvement and significance in SZ §§ 15–18. Entities in the world are indeed understood and made sense of in a context, but this context first and foremost consists in practical reference-relations saturated with value and purposive concerns. Although Heidegger's analysis is mainly about the *experience* of meaning (Bedeutung), his insights also work for the concept of meaning in the context of life's meaning. I suggest a synthetic account based on Heidegger's ideas: the primary sense of “meaning” is valuable purpose, with its secondary sense being teleological intelligibility *sub specie boni* (from the perspective of the good).

Furthermore, I suppose that this account can also in turn help in understanding Heidegger's concept of the world. Based on a classification of meaning inspired by the narrative theorists, one may clarify the structural elements of the totality of involvement—“Wobei,” “Wozu,” “Wofür,” “Warum-willen”—, as well as Heidegger's conception of the world as situation, through concepts such as signification-meaning, cause-meaning, impact-meaning, purpose-meaning, essence-meaning etc.

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The World of Perception in Psychopathological Experience. An Approach from Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's thought aims to describe our daily link with the world (*Lebenswelt*), which he calls perception from the 1940s onwards. Thus, the author elaborates a proposal in which this interrogation leads him to propose different theoretical models linked to each other.

First is a descriptive psychology, in which he discusses *objective thought* through the concept of *behaviour* (*comportement*). Secondly, a *phenomenology of human existence* in which *embodiment* is fundamental. Thirdly, an *ontological psychoanalysis* that moves him to describe the human being as a knot of mo-

bile relations that starts in childhood. Finally, he develops an ontology in which he understands being (*être*), and by extension of the world, under the dynamics of latency and indetermination.

Placed in this context, the following presentation aims to show a description of a transversal subject to all the author's work, namely, the meaningful appearance of the world, and particularly within an experience of growing interest in phenomenology, namely, psychopathology. In other words, this presentation seeks to delimit the type of perception at stake in psychopathology. To achieve this, our inquiry will have three moments. First, and in the light of *La structure du comportement*, it will describe the perceptual relation with the world through what we call the *creative sense power* of the human being. Second, and based on *Phénoménologie de la perception*, it will describe the relationship between sense, world, and corporeality. Finally, and through a reading of *L'institution, la passivité*, it will develop a phenomenology about an unthought of Merleau-Ponty's proposal, i.e., the sense constitution of the world in psychopathology. At the end of this presentation, it hopes to demonstrate that in the psychopathological experience, there is a kind of perception in which human beings are challenged in their daily ability to create sense.

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Rooting into the World in Jan Patočka's Reflections of Space and Spatiality

The contribution will address Jan Patočka's texts on the problems of space and spatiality. The texts are worthy of our attention for several reasons. Patočka writes here about anchoring or taking roots in relation to intersubjectivity and world before he developed the theory of three movements of existence. The question is, in what way these texts deepen our understanding of later elaborations of the concept of anchoring or acceptance. In the contribution it will be argued that the movement of anchoring is not in mere dialectical, even though co-constitutive relation to the movements of reproduction

and truth. It is rather the very grounding movement in such a way, that it permeates the movements of reproduction and truth and determines their meaning. On the one hand, due to this permeating the movements of reproduction and truth are to be understood as modifications of anchoring, that is, as ways of accommodating in the world, which appears as allowing for such accommodation, yet, however, with preserving particular meaning of each of these movements. On the other hand, this permeation calls for more nuanced account of intersubjective relations and givenness of objects of practical concern. Even the most intimate relations, which in their “pure form” call for full anchoring in the other subjectivity, are not devoid of *Abständigkeit*, of concern for the distance from the other for the sake of the other.

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
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